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Legal By-Products of Chemical Testing
for Intoxication
M. C. Slough* and Paul E. Wilson**
O NE AMONG MANY PROBLEMS of national moment is the intoxi-
cated motorist. Legislators have long fumbled for remedies
to halt a wave of senseless killing and mutilation that has re-
sulted from an unhappy combination of ethyl alcohol and
mechanical power. Convictions in court have been too difficult
to halt a wave of senseless killing and mutilation that has re-
constructive and effective legal control. Jurors themselves, have
often been hesitant to convict because the sum total of objective
evidence produced has not convinced them that the subjects they
were judging had actually been drunk or intoxicated.
It is commonplace to write or to speak of the threat of the
drunken driver, when in reality society should be more concerned
with the problem of the drinking driver. Actually, one who is
dead drunk or grossly intoxicated will be so depressed and
anesthetized that he will barely be able to stagger to the steering
wheel. Yet somewhere between sobriety and deep intoxication
a driver can be "under the influence of alcohol," and in this
critical area of perception loss, the use of liquor can significantly
diminish his coordination and cloud his judgment. A motorist's
driving ability can thus be impaired long before he reaches the
extreme states referred to in common parlance as "intoxication"
or "drunkenness."
To obviate unnecessary confusion over a choice of semantics,
the National Conference on Street and Highway Safety, in co-
operation with the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws, prepared a model act which provides that it
shall be unlawful and punishable for any person under the in-
fluence of intoxicating liquor to drive, or to be in actual physical
control of, any vehicle.' By 1961, at least 46 states had likewise
adopted that criterion.2
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1 Uniform Vehicle Code § 11-902 (a) (Emphasis added).
2 Alaska Comp. Laws Ann. § 50-5-3 (Supp. 1958); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann.
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However, sheer adoption of such a provision does not elimi-
nate the practical difficulties inherent in defining the ambiguous
phrase "under the influence." An individual of literal complex
will assert that one bottle of beer can exert sufficient influence,
whereas a boastful and excessive imbiber will deny that anyone
is under the influence so long as he is able to recognize the magic
center line of the highway. Opinions at either extreme are ab-
surd. Obviously the prosecutor need prove only that the sub-
ject's faculties were appreciably affected by strong drink, but
without benefit of factual and concise scientific evidence, even
this burden can evoke a keen sense of frustration.
A generation ago, the objective-symptom tests were the sum
and substance of the prosecution's armory. The arrested person
underwent an arduous series of motion and speech tests, which
included simple balancing procedures, walking and turning,
handwriting, touching the nose, picking up coins from the floor,
and reciting stock tongue-twisters such as "Methodist Episcopal"
and "Around the Rugged Rock the Ragged Rascal Ran." Because
odor of breath was checked and relied upon, invariably the beer
(Continued from preceding page)
§28-692(a) (Supp. 1960); Ark. Stat. Ann. § 75-1027 (1957); Cal. Vehicle
Code Ann. § 23101, 23102 (1960); Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-4-30(1) (Supp.
1960); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 14-227 (1960); Del. Code Ann. tit. 21,
§4111(a) (Supp. 1960); Fla. Stat. §317.20(1) (1955); Ga. Code. Ann.
§ 68-1625(a) (1957); Hawaii Rev. Laws § 311-28 (1955); Idaho Code Ann.
§ 49-1102(a) (1957); Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 95Y2, § 144(a) (1959); Ind. Ann. Stat.
§47-2001(b) (1952); Iowa Code §321.209(2) (1958); Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann.
§8-254(2) (Supp. 1959); Ky. Rev. Stat. § 189.520(2) (1955); La. Rev. Stat.
Ann. § 14.98 (Supp. 1959); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. ch. 22, § 150 (Supp. 1959);
Md. Ann. Code art. 66 , §206(2) (1957); Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 90, §24
(1959); Mich. Comp. Laws §257.625 (Supp. 1956); Minn. Stat. §169.121(1)
(1957); Miss. Code Ann. § 8174 (1957); Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. § 32-2142(1)
(1959); Neb. Rev. Stat. §39-727 (Supp. 1959); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 484.050
(1959); N. H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 262.19 (Supp. 1959); N. J. Stat. Ann. § 39:4-50
(1961); N. M. Stat. Ann. § 64-22-2(a) (Supp. 1961); N. C. Gen. Stat. § 20-138
(1943); N. D. Rev. Code § 39-08-01 (1) (a) (1960); Ohio Rev. Code Ann.
§4511.19 (1958); Okla. Stat. tit. 47, § 93 (Supp. 1959); Ore. Rev. Stat.
§483.992(2) (1959); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 75, §1037 (1960); R. I. Gen. Laws
Ann. §31-27-2(a) (Supp. 1960); S. C. Code §46-343 (Supp. 1960); S. D.
Code §44.0302-1 (Supp. 1952); Tenn. Code Ann. §59.1031 (1955); Utah
Code Ann. §41-66-44(a) (1960); Vt. Stat. tit. 23, § 1183 (1959); Va. Code
Anm. § 18.1-54 (1960); W. Va. Code Ann. § 1721 (331) (Supp. 1959); Wis.
Stat. § 343.31(b) (1958); Wyo. Comp. Stat. Ann. § 31-129(a) (1957). Wash-
ington uses the language "under the influence or affected by." Wash. Rev.
Code § 46.56.010 (1952). Texas defines the prohibited condition as "intoxi-
cated or under the influence." Tex. Pen. Code art. 802 (1961). Only two
states use the term "intoxicated." See Mo. Ann. Stat. § 564.440 (1953) and
N. Y. Vehicle and Traffic Law §1192 (Supp. 1959) (superseded §70(5),
effective Oct. 1, 1960). The Alabama Code formerly employed the term
"intoxicated" but that state has changed its criterion to "under the influence
of intoxicating liquor." Ala. Code tit. 36 § 2 (1958).
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TESTING FOR INTOXICATION
drinker suffered more abuse than he deserved at the moment.
Many offenders were acquitted or released because judges and
juries were loath to premise convictions upon questionable ob-
jective symptoms and the equally questionable testimony of lay
and police witnesses. On the other hand, diabetics suffering from
insulin shock often failed these objective tests and were easy
prey for the ill advised public protector.3
I. Chemical Tests to Determine Blood-Alcohol Concentration
Early research was effected by Widmark in Sweden in the
period between 1914 and 1932 on the problem of alcoholic im-
pairment of drivers. His efforts were largely divided into two
areas: the examination of drivers by subjecting them to certain
psychosensory and psychomotor tests to demonstrate physical im-
pairment, and the chemical testing of body materials to measure
the alcohol level. Though the chemical test for alcohol had been
known for some time, apparently Widmark was the first to sug-
gest the use of the combination of these two tests to examine
suspect drivers. By 1930, results of chemical tests were accepted
as evidence in Swedish courts, and in 1934 a law was adopted in
Sweden which made blood tests compulsory in criminal and in
traffic cases.4 Two years later, the German Minister of the In-
3 Problems of the diabetic are illustrated in a recent opinion by the Su-
preme Court of Minnesota, State v. Simonsen, 252 Minn. 315, 89 N. W. 2d
910 (1958). Medical science recognizes more than sixty pathological con-
ditions which may cause one or more of the symptoms produced by the
excessive use of intoxicants. Even a skilled physician may encounter diffi-
culty in arriving at an accurate diagnosis of alcoholic influence simply by
observing the usual clinical symptoms.
4 Laboratory experiments by a Swedish scientist, Widmark, were in large
part accountable for this enactment. Widmark concluded that when blood-
alcohol is 200 mg. % or more, individuals almost without exception are
intoxicated. For an elaborate and scholarly discussion of the various
methods of blood testing, see Ladd & Gibson, The Medico-Legal Aspects
of the Blood Test to Determine Intoxication, 24 Iowa L. Rev. 191 (1939).
The National Institute of Mental Health has lately announced two new
leads in the treatment of alcoholism which should be of interest to those
concerned with research in the area of blood-alcohol concentration. There
is a substance known as tri-iodothyronine, a hormone derivative, which
has been found, when given intravenously, to bring a person who is
unconscious from the effects of alcohol, in an alcoholic stupor, very rapidly
back to consciousness. Normal metabolism rate of alcohol in the blood is
about 15 mg. per hundred cc.'s of blood per hour, but affected by the drug,
the metabolism rate increases to approximatelyl 30 to 32 mg. per hour. Sub-
jects so treated are not only restored to consciousness, but are able to
coordinate to the extent that they can walk a straight line. Odor of alcohol
leaves the breath because the subject very likely has burned it up. The drug
is contraindicated in coronary artery disease and in adrenal insufficiency.
Research at Johns Hopkins has revealed that an increased dosage of thyroid
extract given to rats will decrease alcohol consumption. Conversely, in the
hypo-thyroid rat, consumption of alcohol will increase.
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terior ordered blood tests in suspected inebriation cases. During
that same year the National Safety Council officially recognized
that a national problem existed and took action by establishing a
special committee called the National Safety Council Committee
on Tests for Intoxication.5 Almost immediately after activation,
the Committee saw fit to design a standard reporting form, which
was in essence an attempt to formalize the use of tests for physical
impairment and chemical tests for alcohol. Joining forces with the
American Medical Association, the Committee was soon dedicated
to the task of setting up standards for interpreting the meaning
of blood alcohol levels. Both organizations lost little time before
recommending adoption of chemical-test procedures in this coun-
try to assist law enforcement officers in interpreting and evalu-
ating the usual symptoms resulting from excessive use of al-
cohol."
Medical science has established with certainty that the per-
centage of alcohol absorbed into the blood and circulated through
the body is closely correlated with the degree to which a person
is under the influence of intoxicating liquor. And it is possible
to predict accurately the percentage of alcohol in the brain (and
hence, degree of "intoxication") by determining the percentage
of alcohol contained in other body substances, namely, the blood,
urine, saliva, or spinal fluid. Perhaps the preponderant amount
of research has been conducted in terms of the percentage of
alcohol in the blood, for the obvious reason that in other than
the post-mortem state, blood is the most conveniently available
body fluid closely in contact with the central nervous system
upon which alcohol exercises its depressant effect. 7 Regardless
5 This committee now bears the title of Committee on Tests for Alcohol
and Drugs. It continues to function as a national clearing house for all
information relevant to its fact finding efforts.
6 Report of Committee to Study Problems of Motor Vehicle Accidents of
the American Medical Association, 119 A. M. A. J. 653 (1942).
7 One might suspect that cerebrospinal fluid would furnish reliable evidence
of alcoholic influence; however, the only spinal fluid that does is the cisternal
spinal fluid obtained from the base of the brain. There is a decided delay in
passage of alcohol down the spinal canal to the lumbar region where spinal
fluid may be obtained with comparative safety. Actually, the best evidence
of the extent of alcoholic influence would result from a direct measurement
of the alcoholic content of nerve structures themselves, but for obvious
reasons this cannot be effected in living persons. If the subject involved
has been killed in a traffic accident, a coroner or medical examiner should
have discretionary authority to order an appropriate post-mortem exami-
nation which might include a chemical test of body substances to determine
what caused or contributed to the death. Commonwealth v. Capalbo, 308
Mass. 376, 32 N. E. 2d 225 (1941); State v. Kelton, 299 S. W. 2d 493 (Mo.
1957).
Jan., 1962
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of the body substance tested, the result attained can readily be
translated into terms of the percentage of alcohol in the blood.
A. Ranges of Alcoholic Concentration
In 1938 the Committee on Tests for Intoxication recom-
mended blood alcohol levels as an index of intoxication. At that
time it was recognized, and still recognized, that a subject with
a blood-alcohol concentration of 0.05 percent or less is not "under
the influence of intoxicating liquor." With a concentration of
0.05 per cent to 0.15 per cent, many individuals will be "under the
influence" and one evidencing a concentration of more than 0.15
per cent will invariably suffer impairment of driving ability.
These ranges of alcoholic concentration, now accepted as an
article of faith, have been incorporated into the Uniform Vehicle
Code, which provides:
In any criminal prosecution for a violation of paragraph (a)
of this section relating to driving a vehicle while under the
influence of intoxicating liquor, the amount of alcohol in
the defendant's blood at the time alleged as shown by chemi-
cal analysis of the defendant's blood, urine, breath or other
bodily substance shall give rise to the following presump-
tions:
1. If there was at that time 0.05 per cent or less by weight of
alcohol in the defendant's blood, it shall be presumed that
the defendant was not under the influence of intoxicating
liquor;
2. If there was at that time in excess of 0.05 per cent, but
less than 0.15 per cent by weight of alcohol in the defendant's
blood, such fact shall not give rise to any presumption that
the defendant was or was not under the influence of in-
toxicating liquor, but such fact may be considered with other
competent evidence in determining the guilt or innocence of
the defendant;
3. If there was at that time 0.15 per cent or more by weight
of alcohol in the defendant's blood, it shall be presumed
that the defendant was under the influence of intoxicating
liquor;
4. The foregoing provisions of paragraph (b) shall not be
construed as limiting the introduction of any other com-
petent evidence bearing upon the question whether or not
the defendant was under the influence of intoxicating liquor.8
8 Uniform Vehicle Code § 11-902(b). It is a matter of common knowledge
that persons of the same sex, age, and weight may evidence a remarkable
variability in their responses to intoxicating liquor. Furthermore, it is a
(Continued on next page)
5Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1962
11 CLEV-MAR. L. R. (1)
Similar provisions have been incorporated into the motor
vehicle codes of at least 17 statesY As might be expected, this
legislative effort has been criticized readily, especially by prose-
cutors who have encountered difficulty in convicting defendants
who register a blood-alcohol concentration in the middle range;
juries in particular tend to require showing of a blood-alcohol
concentration of 0.15 per cent before finding that the accused is
under the influence. Viewed critically, these complaints are no
doubt justifiable for the vast majority of persons do evidence
marked impairment of driving ability, ergo judgment, when the
blood-alcohol level reaches even 0.12 or 0.13 per cent.
(Continued from preceding page)
well-established fact that concentrations of blood-alcohol will be much
lower among persons who have developed a tolerance to alcohol than
among others, for in tolerant individuals absorption of alcohol is slower or
elimination more rapid. Gradwohl, Legal Medicine 763 (1954). See text
following note 22 infra.
9 The following state statutes create presumptions substantially like those
found in the Uniform Vehicle Code: Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 28-692(b) (1960) ;
Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-4-30 (2) (Supp. 1960); Ga. Code Ann. § 68-1625(b)
(1957); Hawaii Rev. Laws §311-29 (1955); Idaho Code Ann. §49-1102(b)
(1957); Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 95 , § 144(b) (1959); Ky. Rev. Stat. § 189.520 (4)
(1959); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., ch. 90, § 24(1) (e) (Supp. 1961); Mont. Rev.
Code Ann. § 32-2142(2) (Supp. 1959); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 39-727.01 (Supp.
1959); Nev. Rev. Stat. §484.055 (Supp. 1959); N. J. Stat. Ann. §39:4-50.1
(1961); S. C. Code § 46-344 (1952); S. D. Code § 44.0302-1 (Supp. 1952);
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44 (Supp. 1959); Va. Code Ann. § 18-75.3 (Supp.
1958); Wash. Rev. Code §46.56.010 (1952); Wyo. Comp. Stat. Ann.
§ 31-129(b) (1957).
Tenn. Code Ann. § 59.1033 (1955) contains only the presumption that
one whose blood contains 0.15% or more alcohol is under the influence
thereof. Another group of state laws uses the quantitative standards em-
ployed in the uniform code, but, within the framework of the statute, the
result of the test constitutes prima facie evidence instead of creating a
presumption: Del. Code. Ann. tit. 11, § 3507 (Supp. 1960); Ind. Stat. Ann.
§47-2003(2) (Supp. 1961); Md. Ann. Code art. 35, §100(a) (Supp. 1959);
Minn. Stat. § 169.121(2) (1957); N. H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 262.20 (1955); N. Y.
Vehicle & Traffic Law § 1192 (superseded § 70(5) effective Oct. 1, 1960);
N. D. Rev. Code § 39-20-07 (1960); Ore. Rev. Stat. § 483.630(1) (5) (a)
(1959); W. Va. Code Ann. § 1721 (331a) (Supp. 1959); Wis. Stat. § 325.235
(1958). Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. ch. 22, § 150 (Supp. 1959) differs only in that
it provides that 0.07% or less alcohol in the blood shall be taken as prima
facie evidence that the subject was not under the influence of intoxicants.
Arkansas courts receive results of chemical analyses as evidence only, Ark.
Stat. Ann. § 1031.1 (1957) giving such evidence neither prima facie nor
presumptive effect. In Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 8-1005 (Supp. 1959), the
legislature has uniquely failed to recognize a doubtful area in which the
chemical test should not be given presumptive effect. There, if the test
shows under 0.15% alcohol, the subject is presumed not under the influence,
while a presumption of influence arises with the presence of 0.15% or more
of alcohol in the blood. Vt. Stat. § 1189 (Supp. 1959) differs from the Uni-
form Vehicle Code only in that there is a conclusive presumption of non-
intoxication if the blood-alcohol content is 0.05% or less. Despite a lack of
specific legislation in Ohio concerning the presumptive or prima facie ef-
fects of alcohol, it has been held proper for judges to refer to such levels
in their instructions. State v. Titak, 75 Abs. 430, 144 N. E. 2d 255 (1955).
Jan., 1962
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Evidently serious consideration should be given to a down-
ward revision of the present formula, and greater emphasis
should be placed upon corroborating factors inevitably brought
to light in borderline cases. The National Safety Council Com-
mittee has more recently recommended that the lines of demarca-
tion be amplified in the following manner: 0.00 per cent to 0.05
per cent, safe; 0.05 per cent to 0.10 per cent, possibly under the
influence; 0.10 per cent to 0.15 per cent, probably under the in-
fluence.10 Also important to regard is the fact that this report
has recognized that chemical tests, important and valid as they
are, should not constitute the sole basis for determining whether
a person is under the influence of alcohol when other evidence
is available."
B. Methods of Obtaining Specimens: A Comparison
The blood test is undeniably accurate, yet in the normal
pattern of law enforcement it may not be practically feasible.
The drawing of a blood sample, though not inherently dangerous,
does involve an invasion of the person as well as the inconven-
ience incidental to making the necessary trip to a physician's
office, clinic, or hospital. Furthermore, only a physician, nurse,
or qualified medical technician should be permitted to draw
blood, and the services of these trained individuals are not always
readily available. Moreover, if there is an appreciable delay be-
tween the time of the accident or arrest and the time of drawing
the blood sample, the percentage of blood-alcohol is likely to
drop considerably.
Although one need not be a clinical expert to gather saliva,
and only a small amount is necessary for testing purposes, one
must reckon with a delay factor in terms of receiving the results
of chemical analysis. As a rule, urine tests are satisfactory, but
10 Notice, however, that even the presumption that one is definitely under
the influence of alcohol is rebuttable. During the years 1948-51, a research
project was conducted at Michigan State University for the National Safety
Council. Tests were run to evaluate the comparability and reliability of
chemical tests generally to determine alcoholic influence. When concentra-
tion had reached or exceeded 0.15%, impairment of driving ability was
noted in every case. In a majority of cases, impairment was evident at a
figure appreciably below the 0.15% figure. See comment on this project in
People v. Miller, 357 Mich. 400, 98 N. W. 2d 524, 526 (1959).
11 It is highly important that police in making arrests for driving while
under the influence follow a carefully established procedure designed to
secure and record all relevant information procurable by observation and
questioning. McCormick, Evidence § 176, at 377 (1954).
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during the absorptive phase, concentration of alcohol in the se-
creted urine lags considerably behind blood-alcohol concentra-
tion, because excretion through the kidneys cannot occur until
after the alcohol is absorbed into the blood, distributed through
the aqueous parts of the body, and carried to the kidneys. 12 All
factors considered, breath seems to be the most pragmatic sub-
stance from the standpoint of the average law enforcement
agency's proficiency in obtaining potential blood-alcohol speci-
mens.
In practical police work, breath analysis serves a useful pur-
pose in providing easily obtainable specimens and a quick, reason-
able test result to guide the officer. The concentration of al-
cohol in the exhaled (alveolar) breath reflects the alcoholic con-
centration of the blood circulated through the lungs. Approxi-
mately 2100 volume units of alveolar breath contain the same
quantity of alcohol as does one volume unit of circulating blood.
One fundamental principle which makes all breath tests pos-
sible is the basic gas law of Henry and Dalton, which for any
given set of conditions defines the concentration of a volatile
substance present as a vapor in an atmosphere at equilibrium
with the liquid phase of the substance in solution. The condi-
tions which determine this relationship are the nature of the
solute and solvent, and the temperature, thus in the case of
alcohol and blood, this relationship is ordinarily expressed as
the ratio of the concentration of alcohol in the blood to that in
the air at equilibrium with it-the coefficient of distribution.
Presently, there are several types of portable breath-testing
units available, and if tests are properly conducted by experi-
enced personnel, each type accurately measures the concentra-
tion of alcohol circulating in the blood. Breath has become a
popular material for chemical analysis inasmuch as the sampling
and analytical procedures are so simple that a trained police of-
ficer can make reliable analyses in most cases, and in addition,
results are available when the officer most needs them, shortly
after arrest.
All available units operate on essentially the same principle,
that is, decolorization of a measured quantity of chemical by al-
cohol in the exhaled breath which has been trapped in a balloon.
12 Although saliva and urine are simple substances to collect, frequently
during the emotional disturbance created by arrest or accident, the person
will be quite unable to produce either type of fluid in quantity.
Jan., 1962
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Among the perfected devices widely used are the drunkometer,"
the intoximeter,14 the alcometer, 15 and the breathalyzer; 10 except
for scattered adverse criticism, results obtained through their use
appear to be scientifically acceptable."
C. Judicial Acceptance of Breath Tests
With one outstanding exception,'8 appellate courts have
unanimously approved the various tests outlined. Approval or
13 This testing apparatus was developed by Doctor R. N. Harger, Professor
of Biochemistry and Toxicology at the Indiana University School of Medi-
cine. The test involves collecting a sample of expired breath in a balloon
and titrating this breath into a reagent composed of potassium permanga-
nate in sulfuric acid. Apparently, test validity is not influenced by acetone
or breath odors. Doctor Harger is a noted authority in his field and has
written extensively on matters pertaining to alcoholic intoxication. See,
e.g., Harger, Distribution of Absorbed Alcohol: Body Materials Which
Yield Reliable Results, 1 J. Forensic Sciences 27 (1956); Some Practical
Aspects of Chemical Tests for Intoxication, 35 J. Crim. L. C. & P. S. 202
(1944).
14 Developed and perfected by Doctor G. C. Forrester, this device follows
the principles of the drunkometer, including the alcohol-carbon dioxide
ratio. In final test procedures, magnesium perchlorate is used rather than
the permanganate employed in the drunkometer. For use in court, the
chemical unit must be prepared by a chemist or skilled technician so that
he may testify concerning its original condition as well as to its change
incidental to the test. Only a highly trained individual is qualified to con-
duct an analysis with the intoximeter whereas persons with little formal
training may achieve competence in the operation of the drunkometer,
alcometer, or breathalyzer.
15 The alcometer utilizes iodine pentoxide as an oxidizing agent. Results
are evaluated in terms of the dependability of the determination of iodine
by means of the starch-iodine color measured photometrically. Developed
by L. A. Greenberg and F. W. Keator of Yale University, this ingenious
device is nearly foolproof. It is known as the most automatic of the breath
testing devices. However, the unit does require a constant source of 110-
volt alternating current and is both heavy and expensive. As a rule there-
fore, it must be used in police headquarters. For purposes of preserving
adequate records, some police departments photograph the apparatus during
testing situations, with the meter-reading showing the blood-alcohol per-
centage, the officer giving the test, the person being examined and the
calendar all on one film.
16 The breathalyzer, another photoelectric instrument, is a relatively new
device and was invented by Captain R. F. Borkenstein of the Indiana State
Police Department. A breath sample is passed through a solution of potas-
sium dichromate and sulfuric acid which reacts with alcohol. As alcohol is
absorbed, the solution, normally yellow, changes color; if there is no
alcohol present, no color change occurs. The breathalyzer may be used on
alternating current or on direct current from an automobile battery.
17 Doctor Haggard and associates have published a criticism of the drunko-
meter, The Alcohol of the Lung Air as an Index of Alcohol in the Blood,
26 J. Lab. Clin. Med. 1527 (1941), to which Doctor Harger has replied;
"Debunking" the Drunkometer, 40 J. Crim. L. C. & P. S. 497 (1949).
18 In People v. Morse, 325 Mich. 270, 38 N. W. 2d 322 (1949), the Supreme
Court of Michigan, by drawing an analogy to the ill-fated lie detector, found
(Continued on next page)
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acceptance does not mean that courts have failed to recognize
honest disagreement in scientific circles, but as a rule judicial
opinions have considered reliability of the tests to be a matter af-
fecting the weight of the evidence introduced, rather than its
admissibility. In practice, test results are admitted whenever a
qualified expert witness testifies that the particular test method
employed is reliable and generally accepted as such by other ex-
perts in the discipline.' 9
(Continued from preceding page)
that testimony in the record failed to establish that the Harger drunkometer
test had achieved general scientific recognition, and ruled that the admis-
sion into evidence of testimony concerning the drunkometer and the test
results constituted reversible error. Two police officers with limited knowl-
edge of chemistry and a young physician who had worked as a student
assistant to Harger were called by the state as expert witnesses. The
defendant, son of an eminent Detroit pathologist, produced five outstanding
physicians as experts, one of whom (when referring to the drunkometer)
stated that the "thing works like a slot machine." One of the other defense
experts testified that most of the medical profession considered the method
of testing unreliable. Undoubtedly the defense witnesses were reputable
professional men but it was apparent that their personal contacts with the
drunkometer were minimal and all based their testimony on articles writ-
ten by authors critical of procedures employed in the drunkometer test.
See Donigan, Chemical Tests and the Law 51 (1957).
In fairness to the Michigan opinion, it should be observed that the court
did not say that the test method employed in any given case must be recog-
nized and approved by all medical and scientific authorities. Obviously, it
would be most impractical to insist that any scientific equipment of this
nature must be accepted without exception or dissent.
The trial scene in People v. Bobczyk, 343 Ill. App. 504, 99 N. E. 2d 567
(1951), an action brought in the Municipal Court of Chicago, presents an
interesting contrast. Defendant was charged with driving a motor vehicle
while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. In his testimony, he ad-
mitted that before the collision he had consumed two glasses of beer, but
he denied having had any other intoxicants through the course of the day.
Daniel Dragel, Evidence Evaluator at the Chicago Crime Detection Labora-
tory, -who operated the drunkometer in the case, testified that the test dis-
closed a 0.30% concentration of alcohol in the defendant's blood, and that in
his opinion, the defendant was under the influence of alcohol at the time
of arrest. Doctor Harger also testified for the prosecution as did Doctor
Clarence Muehlberger, a widely known toxicologist. On the basis of this
testimony, the defendant was convicted. And on appeal to the Appellate
Court of Illinois, the conviction was affirmed. The question had never been
presented to an Illinois court of review prior to this decision. The court,
while rejecting the opinion in People v. Morse, supra, relied heavily upon
a more recent Texas decision, McKay v. State, 155 Tex. Crim. 416, 235 S. W.
2d 173 (1950), which recognized the Harger drunkometer as scientifically
acceptable. See also People v. Gamier, 20 Ill. App. 492, 156 N. E. 2d 613
(1959).
19 "This court may recognize generally accepted scientific conclusions, even
though there should be some who disagree with them. In all probability a
scientist may be found who will disagree with practically every generally
accepted scientific theory." McKay v. State, 155 Tex. Crim. 416, 419, 235
S. W. 2d 173, 174 (1950). The following cases are particularly applicable to
the problem of expert testimony and the reliability of the various testing
(Continued on next page)
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Although courts have recognized the accuracy of standard
testing procedures and legislative enactments have lent credence
to the conclusion that alcohol has a measurable psychophysical
effect upon the human organism, one cannot overstress the neces-
sity for supplying an adequate foundation before test results are
offered in evidence. 20 Each facet of the testing situation should
be thoroughly explained, including the methods employed and
the manner in which the analysis was made.2 1 When possible
one should produce an expert witness who can attest not only
to the scientific reliability of the chemical testing procedures
followed but also vouch for their correct administration in the
(Continued from preceding page)
devices: State v. Olivas, 77 Ariz. 118, 267 P. 2d 893 (1954); State v. Hunter,
4 N. J. Super. 531, 68 A. 2d 274 (1949); Toms v. State, 95 Okla. Crim. 60,
239 P. 2d 812 (1952); Jackson v. State, 159 Tex. Crim. 228, 262 S. W. 2d
499 (1953); Annot., 159 A. L. R. 209 (1945).
20 In addition, one must be warned against complete reliance upon scientific
evidence. Chemical symbols and arithmetical computations, though clini-
cally infallible, may fall short of convincing a skeptical and unsympathetic
jury, particularly in borderline cases. Objective proof of aberrational con-
duct is ordinarily easy to obtain and record. As a rule, police officers do not
conduct haphazard searches for motorists who may be under the influence
of alcohol. Before a motorist attracts the attention of an officer, he must
have acted carelessly in some overt way, such as driving in a reckless
manner, passing another car on a hill or around a curve, or weaving back
and forth across the highway. And after being apprehended, the motorist
may exhibit other characteristics suggestive of overindulgence in intoxi-
cants. The officer normally checks the motorist's appearance, behavior,
carriage and speech, and then proceeds to inquire as to when, where, and
how much the subject has been drinking. Successful prosecution does not
hinge upon a test-tube reaction alone, but rather upon the sum total of the
officer's observations as substantiated by the results of the chemical test.
21 Certified copies of official or unofficial reports concerning test analyses
cannot qualify as adequate evidence to prove the authenticity, accuracy, or
results of a chemical test performed to determine alcoholic influence. One
cannot by-pass the need for testimony by qualified experts in the field,
because a written laboratory report without more is hearsay and inadmis-
sible as evidence. This does not mean that such records and reports do not
serve a useful function, for they may be used for refreshing recollection,
and when maintained in the usual course of business, are admissible to aid
in proving elements of the case which do not involve expert conclusions
and opinions. Estes v. State, 162 Tex. Crim. 122, 283 S. W. 2d 52 (1955). It
is not absolutely necessary that the expert testifying have conducted every
phase of the chemical analysis personally; if the analysis in question was
conducted under his supervision and control, he is a proper party to testify
concerning test results. State v. Bailey, 184 Kan. 704, 339 P. 2d 45 (1959).
As a practical matter, in traffic courts, police courts, and generally in
courts of the magistrate level, evidence is offered and received with a
minimum of formality. Written laboratory reports are frequently accepted
without further testimony or authentication, and since procedure is sum-
mary in nature and objections likely to be few, the practice continues.
When these lower court convictions are appealed to courts of general juris-
diction, it is reasonable to assume that prosecuting authorities will be more
alert to the need for accurate authentication and foundation testimony.
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particular case being litigated. In order to qualify as an expert
on all phases of the subject, one needs advanced training in
chemistry and some basic training in physical medicine. Be-
cause of the nature of their training and practical experience,
physicians, toxicologists, biochemists, and medical technologists
usually are accepted as experts. Through limited training and
experience, the ordinary police officer may learn to competently
operate one or more of the breath-testing devices. Yet, obviously
he cannot testify concerning the quality or strength of chemicals
used or the chemical or mathematical formulas employed; nor
can he interpret and analyze the numerical readings which in-
dicate the existence of a given quantity of alcohol in the blood.22
Furthermore prosecutors must be warned against assuming
that a given concentration of alcohol will produce substantially
the same degree of intoxication in everyone, for individual tol-
erance and other subjective factors make this assumption false.
An abstainer may perform subnormally when his blood-alcohol
level reaches a threshold value of 0.02 to 0.04 per cent. However,
as much as 0.08 to 0.09 per cent blood-alcohol concentration may
be required to measurably impair the calm of a heavy drinker.23
It must also be recalled that test results reveal neither the
amount of alcohol consumed nor the time when the drinking was
done; but they do indicate the amount of alcohol remaining un-
burned in the blood at the time the specimen was obtained. Ob-
viously the prosecutor is most directly concerned with the per-
centage of blood-alcohol present at the time of the incident in
question. Although there may be an appreciable time lag be-
tween occurrence of the incident and the time of taking a speci-
men for analysis, there is ample authority upholding the admis-
sibility of expert testimony estimating the percentage of blood-
alcohol concentration present at the time of the event on the
basis of the results of a test conducted subsequent to the event.
Reliable estimates by expert witnesses may be made by a mathe-
22 Alexander v. State, 305 P. 2d 572 (Okla. Crim. App. 1956); Hill v. State,
158 Tex. Crim. 313, 256 S. W. 2d 93 (1953); Omohundro v. County of Arling-
ton, 194 Va. 773, 75 S. E. 2d 496 (1953). As a rule, an individual who oper-
ates an intoximeter must be a qualified chemist or technician and will
therefore be able to testify in court concerning the chemical phases of the
test conducted. Qualifications for operation of the drunkometer, alcometer
and breathalyzer are less exacting, and it is very likely that the operator
himself will be unable to provide adequate information with respect to
scientific principles involved in the testing situation.
23 See note 8 supra.
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matical process known as extrapolation. Given a known rate of
elimination of blood-alcohol in the average person, an expert can
reasonably estimate the percentage of blood-alcohol in the
average person at the time of a certain event, based upon the
quantity of alcohol in the blood as shown in the chemical test.
An expert witness may present an acceptable estimate of the
blood-alcohol concentration of a particular person if he is given
definite facts from which he can determine the rate of elimination
taking place in the individual's body.24
24 By taking two or more specimens from the individual during regularly
spaced intervals, the expert can determine the rate of elimination in the
individual on the particular occasion, and can further determine the blood-
alcohol concentration in the same individual at the time of the event in
question. Donigan, Chemical Tests and the Law 38 (1957); Newman, Proof
of Alcoholic Intoxication, 34 Ky. L. J. 250 (1946). Ray v. State, 233 Ind.
495, 120 N. E. 2d 176 (1954), provides an example of the importance of
valid expert opinion. The defendant had been charged with manslaughter
following a fatal crash, and the drunkometer test revealed that one hour
and forty-five minutes after the accident the percentage of alcohol in the
defendant's blood was .139 per cent by weight. The prosecution posed a
hypothetical question which, in substance, asked the expert witness, Doc-
tor R. N. Harger, whether he could tell what the percentage of alcohol
would have been at the time of the accident. Defendant's objection on the
ground that the question called for a guess or broad conjecture was over-
ruled. Doctor Harger then stated that the minimum alcoholic concentration
an hour and forty-five minutes preceding testing would have been .165,
although he explained that the percentage might have been higher because
some persons are faster "burners" than others. The Supreme Court of
Indiana ruled that the hypothetical question was proper in this instance
and pointed out that the weight to be given the expert's testimony was
for the jury to determine by considering his knowledge of the subject about
which he testified.
In the following decisions, courts have approved admissibility of expert
opinion concerning concentration of alcohol at the time of the incident, based
upon results of delayed tests. People v. Haeussler, 41 Cal. 2d 252, 260 P. 2d
8 (1953), cert. denied, 347 U. S. 931 (1954) (approximately 4 hours delay);
Nicholson v. City of Des Moines, 246 Iowa 318, 67 N. W. 2d 533 (1954)
(approximately 3 hours delay); State v. Stairs, 143 Me. 245, 60 A. 2d 141
(1948) (approximately 4 hours delay). While alcohol concentration at the
time of the event is usually higher than that prevailing at the time a sample
is received, the converse may be true under extraordinary circumstances.
If one should consume a considerable quantity of alcohol and become in-
volved in an accident before the absorption phase is completed, a subse-
quent chemical test will likely show a blood-alcohol concentration higher
than that existing at the time of the accident. See Commonwealth v. Hart-
man, 383 Pa. 461, 119 A. 2d 211 (1956). Attention is directed to the statutes
of several states which limit admissibility of chemical-test evidence to those
situations wherein specimens were taken within two hours of the event or
within two hours of the time of arrest. For example, Minnesota provides
that a court may admit evidence of the percentage of alcohol in a person's
blood, if the test was taken voluntarily within two hours after commission
of the offense. Minn. Stat. § 169.121 (1957). The statutes of Delaware, New
York, Virginia, and Wisconsin contain similar provisions. For pertinent
statutory citations, see note 2 supra.
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H. Constitutional and Statutory Restrictions
At this juncture, the great majority of courts will admit evi-
dence of test results where, as is true in most cases, the subject
voluntarily submits to testing. However, an arrested person's
refusal to cooperate may raise further legal problems concerning
the use of chemical tests: (a) the possibility that involuntary
submission may constitute a violation of the privilege against
self-incrimination; (b) that the taking of a body substance may
amount to an unlawful search or seizure; (c) that the manner
of taking the body substance could constitute a violation of due
process; and (d) if a physician is involved, whether the time-
worn physician-patient privilege applies when expert testimony
is offered in court.
A. Self-Incrimination
(1) Scope of the Privilege
A series of decisions handed down through the past century
has determined that the Federal Bill of Rights, including the
fifth amendment protection against self-incrimination, binds only
the federal government.2 5 In Twining v. New Jersey,26 the Su-
preme Court of the United States held that the fourteenth
amendment does not impose the self-incrimination restriction
upon state action either under the privileges and immunities
clause or as a requirement of fair trial under the due process
clause of that amendment. The Court has more recently af-
firmed the due process part of this policy-making decision in
Adamson v. California.27 Nevertheless, a privilege against self-
25 Feldman v. United States, 322 U. S. 487 (1944); Brown v. Walker, 161
U. S. 591 (1896).
26 211 U. S. 78 (1908).
27 332 U. S. 46 (1947). In dissent, Mr. Justice Black, supported by Justices
Murphy, Rutledge and Douglas, was of the opinion that the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment made all the guarantees of the Bill of
Rights binding on the states. This, he believed, was the intention of the
framers of the amendment, as indicated by the historical evidence. In a
vigorous, well-documented attack on the Court's time-honored, natural
law method of interpreting the fourteenth amendment, he contended that
it was the intent of Congress, when passing that amendment, to guarantee
the privileges of the Bill of Rights against abridgment by state action. Id. at
68-92. He also stated that the Court should give effect to that intent and
cease to "'roam at will in the limitless area of their own beliefs as to reason-
ableness.'" Id. at 92, quoting from FPC v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 315
U. S. 575, 599, 601 n. 4 (1942). His proposals, though well phrased, were not
(Continued on next page)
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incrimination does apply in every jurisdiction in the nation-in
forty-eight states by constitution, and in the remaining two by
statute. As the constitutions and statutes of the several states
vary in terminology, so do the decisions interpreting the scope
of the privileges provided for.
Historically, the privileges against self-incrimination has had
little, if any, pertinency to the taking of body substances. As
expressed in federal and state constitutions, the privilege pro-
vides a safeguard against being compelled to be a witness, being
compelled to give oral testimony in court, and being compelled
to produce in court (or in any formal governmental hearing)
under judicial order, documents and other objects, the forced
disclosure of which would amount to testimonial compulsion. In
Dean Wigmore's words: "It is the employment of legal process
to extract from the person's own lips an admission of his guilt." 28
The prohibition against compelling a man to be a witness against
himself is a condemnation of the use of physical or moral com-
pulsion to extract communications from him, and does not apply
to the admissibility in evidence of his body substances.2 9
A clear majority of recent cases support the earlier de-
cisions which applied the privilege only to testimonial compul-
sion.30 However, the arena is not free from dissent. The Texas
decisions are typical of the minority which adheres to a broader
interpretation of the privilege. In Apodaca v. State,3 1 the ac-
(Continued from preceding page)
new and have been specifically rejected in a long line of cases. See Notes,
33 Iowa L. Rev. 666 (1948); 46 Mich. L. Rev. 372 (1948); 58 Yale L. J. 268
(1949). The Court has very recently reiterated the long established doc-
trine that the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination is not
applicable to the states. Cohen v. Hurley, 366 U. S. 117 (1961).
28 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2263 (3d ed. 1940). See Note, Scientific Tests for
Intoxication-a Constitutional Limitation, 39 Va. L. Rev. 215 (1953).
29 State v. Sturtevant, 96 N. H. 99, 70 A. 2d 909 (1950); State v. Gatton, 60
Ohio App. 192, 20 N. E. 2d 265 (1938); Inbau, Self Incrimination 72 (1950);
McCormick, Evidence § 126 (1954).
30 Holt v. United States, 218 U. S. 245 (1910); People v. Trujillo, 32 Cal. 2d
105, 194 P. 2d 681 (1948); People v. Conterno, 170 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 817,
339 P. 2d 968 (1959); Block v. People, 125 Colo. 36, 240 P. 2d 512 (1951),
cert. denied, 343 U. S. 978 (1952); State v. Smith, 47 Del. 334, 91 A. 2d 188
(1952); Alldredge v. State, 239 Ind. 256, 156 N. E. 2d 888 (1959); State v.
Sturtevant, 96 N. H. 99, 70 A. 2d 909 (1950); State v. Titak, 75 Ohio L. Abs.
430, 144 N. E. 2d 255 (1955); State v. Cram, 176 Ore. 577, 160 P. 2d 283(1945); Commonwealth v. Safis, 122 Pa. Super. 333, 186 Atl. 177 (1936);
State v. Pierce, 120 Vt. 373, 141 A. 2d 419 (1958). See 24 Minn. L. Rev. 444
(1940).
31 140 Tex. Crim. 593, 146 S. W. 2d 381 (1941).
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cused had killed a pedestrian, and upon his arrest was required
to furnish a urine specimen and perform a routine of muscular
movements-the usual sudden turns, walking the line, and the
finger-on-nose exhibition. In the opinion of the examiners, both
sets of tests indicated alcoholic intoxication, but the appellate
court ruled that compelling such action violated the privilege
against self-incrimination.
Fifteen years later, in Trammell v. State,32 the Texas Court
of Criminal Appeals subscribed to the same strict principle an-
nounced in Apodaca, which required express consent of the ac-
cused before submission to a clinical-symptom test or chemical
test of the breath or body fluids. In the Trammell case, the ac-
cused was injured in a traffic collision and while still in an un-
conscious state, was promptly transported to a hospital, where a
specimen of blood was extracted from his arm. At the trial a
toxicologist testified that the blood sample had been analyzed
under his supervision. Over objection by the defense, the wit-
ness stated that the alcoholic concentration in the sample was
0.328 per cent. He further testified that no authority would dis-
agree that such alcoholic concentration indicated definite intoxi-
cation. On appeal, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals applied
the self-incrimination privilege to this type of compelled con-
duct, thereby reversing the trial court's admission of the testi-
mony, and proceeded to consider whether the defendant had
waived the privilege. There was no testimony showing that the
accused had consented to the taking of the blood sample, nor was
there testimony that he did not assent or agree. The appellate
court held that the state failed to prove that the specimen was
taken with the consent of the accused, and thus the accused had
not waived his privilege against self-incrimination. Consequently,
the testimony of the toxicologist was inadmissible. 33
32 162 Tex. Crim. 543, 287 S. W. 2d 487 (1956): Annot., 25 A. L. R. 2d 1407
(1952).
33 The Texas decision has been clarified in a later decision, Sartain v. State,
346 S. W. 2d 337 (Tex. Crim. 1961). Following arrest for driving while in-
toxicated, officers. took the defendant to a physician's office where a blood
sample was taken. The officers testified that the defendant had agreed and
consented to take a blood test. Defendant admitted that the blood sample
was taken from him but denied giving his consent and denied having been
asked by the officers if he would take the test. Holding that a written con-
sent was not necessary for the taking of a blood specimen, the Court of
Criminal Appeals distinguished this case from Trammell v. State, noting that
in the latter case, it was undisputed that no consent was given, the accused
being unconscious, while in the case at bar the issue was clearly raised by
the evidence. Judgment of conviction in trial court was affirmed.
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Contrary, then, to the traditional scope of the privilege
against self-incrimination is this second or broader view which
extends the protection of the privilege to compelled conduct
other than giving testimony and producing in court documents
and other objects. Under this view, passive submission may be
compelled but not active cooperation.3 4 Thus the accused might
be required to submit to finger-printing, a fluoroscopic examina-
tion or even a purging process, 35 but he could not be compelled
to provide a sample of his handwriting or to aid in re-enacting
the alleged crime. Unfortunately, the fine line distinguishing en-
forced activity does not lend itself to easy and immediate dis-
cernment, and it seems inevitable that the drawing of subtle if
not useless distinctions will lead to indistinguishable conflicts
among judicial opinions.36
The privilege against self-incrimination has been afforded its
broadest interpretation by Justices Black and Douglas in recent
concurring and dissenting opinions. They would extend the pro-
tection of the privilege even to passive submission. Neither
Justice would draw a constitutional distinction between involun-
tary extraction of words, involuntary extraction of the contents
of the stomach, and involuntary extraction of body fluids, when
the evidence obtained is used to convict.3 7 Mr. Justice Black has
34 For a complete discussion of pertinent authorities, see McCormick, Evi-
dence § 126 (1954); Morgan, The Privilege Against Self Incrimination, 34
Minn. L. Rev. 1, 38 (1949).
35 Nowhere in Apodaca was reference made to Ash v. State, 139 Tex. Crim.
420, 141 S. W. 2d 341 (1940), a case decided by the same court only one
year previously. In Ash v. State, the defendant was convicted on a charge
of receiving and concealing stolen property, which consisted of two diamond
rings. When apprehended, the defendant was observed by the arresting
officers to swallow objects, apparently metallic, which they believed to be
the rings in question. He was taken to a hospital, subjected to fluoroscopic
examination and enema against his will, and the stolen rings were thus
recovered. Dismissing defendant's contentions that he had been denied due
process of law and forced to incriminate himself, the reviewing court held:
that the arrest and search were legal since possession of the rings and
secreting. them in the presence of the officers constituted a felony commit-
ted in their presence; that the fluoroscopic and purging process was con-
ducted by experts; that there was no evidence of cruel or inhuman treat-
ment; that the only force used was employed to combat the physical re-
sistane. of :the defendant. In attempting to reconcile the two Texas de-
cisions, one might point out that in Ash the court emphasized enforced
passivity, while in Apodaca, emphasis was apparently upon enforced ac-
tivity through being "compelled to do things." This same distinction between
passivity and activity is clearly illustrated in State v. Griffin, 129 S. C. 200,
124 S. E. 81 (1924).
36 Numerous cases pointing up the conflicting views and their application
in varied fact situations are collected in Annot., 171 A. L. R. 1144 (1947).
37 See the dissenting opinions of Justices Black and Douglas in Breithaupt
v. Abram, 352 U. S. 432, 442 (1957).
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said: "[A] person is compelled to be a witness against himself
when .. .incriminating evidence is forcibly taken from him by
a contrivance of modern science." 38 Mr. Justice Douglas agreed
and stated that "words taken from his lips, capsules taken from
his stomach, blood taken from his veins are all inadmissible pro-
vided they are taken from him without his consent .. . [ ---- ]
inadmissible because of the command of the Fifth Amend-
ment." -9 Both Justices assert that a standard of due process for
trial by the federal government should likewise be observed
by state authorities and continually insist that inhibitions on gov-
ernmental action inherent in the fifth amendment should be
imposed upon the states through the fourteenth amendment.40
Dissenting in Breithaupt v. Abram,4 1 they asserted without
equivocation, that under our system of government, police can-
not compel people to furnish evidence necessary to send them to
prison. In the opinion of the dissenting Justices, if there is no
affirmative consent it is all the same if (1) the victim states
unequivocally that he objects, (2) resists violently, or (3) is un-
able to protest; in any event consent is lacking and that being
the case distinctions are invalid.
Mr. Justice Douglas has noted that judges and lawyers often
forget that the Anglo-American system of criminal law is de-
signed to reduce police control and increase judicial control.4 2
The Black-Douglas dissents constantly remind us of this very
important principle and one cannot deny the import of their pleas
for a rational consideration of individual rights. However, some-
times comparatively unimportant individual interests are un-
necessarily overemphasized at the expense of legitimate govern-
mental interests. Granted, there is an urgent need to provide pro-
tection against torture, both physical and mental; yet it appears
far-fetched to insist that justice will perish simply because the
accused is subject to a duty to respond to orderly governmental
inquiry.43 Actually, Mr. Justice Douglas has conceded that "an
accused can be compelled to be present at trial, to stand, to sit,
38 Rochin v. California, 342 U. S. 165, 175 (1952) (Black, J., concurring).
39 Id. at 179 (Douglas, J., concurring).
40 See note 31 supra.
41 352 U. S. 432, 442 (1957) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
42 Douglas, The Means and the End, 1959 Wash. U. L. Q. 103, 110.
43 See the majority opinion written by Mr. Justice Cardozo in Palko v.
Connecticut, 302 U. S. 319 (1937).
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to turn this way and that, and to try on a cap or a coat." 44 Even
he therefore sanctions a very low degree of compulsion. All legal
writers and jurists agree that somewhere along the continuum
compulsion becomes obnoxious; in Douglas' opinion this occurs
at a point short of outright physical coercion. The exact point
at which this line must constitutionally be drawn has never been
clearly defined nor agreed upon and very likely never will be.
(2) "Consent" by Unconscious Persons
In many accident cases, the subject is actually unconscious
at the time the test is given or the sample drawn and is there-
fore in no position to voice disapproval. Regardless of this ob-
vious deprivation of privacy, most authorities have held that evi-
dence of test results is admissible.45 Moreover, the fact that a
person has sufficient alcohol in his blood to make him an unsafe
driver does not automatically render him incapable of "consent-
ing" to a chemical test.4 G The general rule is that even if the ac-
cused is mentally incapable of perceiving or comprehending
events and his surroundings, he is still legally capable of con-
sent. Yet it is conceivable that extreme intoxication will point
to lack of real consent and necessitate rejection of chemical-test
evidence in those jurisdictions where express consent is a con-
dition precedent to the admissibility of test results. 47 However,
a majority of jurisdictions have admitted chemical-test evidence
without proof of actual consent, barring objection on constitu-
tional grounds.48 Even in jurisdictions where consent is required,
44 Rochin v. California, 342 U. S. 165, 179 (1952) (Douglas, J., concurring).
45 People v. Haeussler, 41 Cal. 2d 252, 260 P. 2d 8 (1953), cert. denied, 347
U. S. 931 (1954). While Mrs. Haeussler was unconscious, a hospital attend-
ant withdrew five cubic centimeters of blood from her arm. Test results
were admitted in evidence, the Supreme Court of California holding that
this procedure did not violate either the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion or the right to due process. See also Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U. S.
432 (1957); Block v. People, 125 Colo. 36, 240 P. 2d 512 (1951), cert. denied,
343 U. S. 978 (1952); State v. Sturtevant, 96 N. H. 99, 70 A. 2d 909 (1950).
46 Bowden v. State, 95 Okla. Crim. 382, 246 P. 2d 427 (1952); Jones v. State,
159 Tex. Crim. 29, 261 S. W. 2d 161 (1953), cert. denied, 346 U. S. 830 (1953).
47 In two states the case law requires express consent. State v. Wardlaw,
107 So. 2d 179 (Fla. 1958); McCreary v. State, 307 S. W. 2d 948 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1957). Chemical-test legislation in Colorado, New Jersey, North Dakota,
Oregon, and Virginia requires the person's express consent. See relevant
statutes cited note 2 supra. In Minnesota, admissibility of test results is
dependent upon a voluntary submission. Minn. Stat. § 169.121 (1957). See
State v. McCarthy, 104 N. W. 2d 673 (Minn. 1960).
48 Where the subject is unconscious at the time the sample is drawn, in
actuality he neither consents nor refuses. Without express statutory pro-
hibition or objection raised on constitutional grounds, evidence of test re-
sults is generally admissible in such cases.
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it is generally held that written consent is not necessary; 49 nor
is it necessary to warn the accused, before he submits to a chemi-
cal test, that the results might be used against him in a subse-
quent criminal proceeding.5 0
B. Unlawful Search and Seizure
Whether a search of private property or personal effects is
reasonably necessary must be determined by the facts and cir-
cumstances of the individual case. 51 Normally, a search warrant
must be obtained, but when the search is incident to a lawful
arrest, failure to obtain a warrant does not necessarily make the
search unreasonable.5 2
The fourth amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and
seizures,53 but until very recently (the Wolf case) the Supreme
Court of the United States had consistently held that the amend-
ment did not necessarily preclude the use in a criminal trial of
evidence obtained by an unreasonable search or seizure. 54 Al-
though the Court had held that such illegally obtained evidence
49 Written consent is required in Oregon by statute. Ore. Rev. Stat.
§ 483.630 (1955). In Texas, a confession statute requires that a confession
obtained from an accused under arrest be in writing. However, the Texas
courts have not extended this statutory requirement to the obtaining of
specimens for chemical testing and oral consent is sufficient. Tealer v.
State, 163 Tex. Crim. 629, 296 S. W. 2d 260 (1956); Brown v. State, 156 Tex.
Crim. 144, 240 S. W. 2d 310 (1951).
50 State v. Duguid, 50 Ariz 276, 72 P. 2d 435 (1937); People v. Hardin, 138
Cal. App. 2d 169, 291 P. 2d 193 (1955).
51 "The relevant test is not whether it is reasonable to procure a search
warrant, but whether the search was reasonable. That criterion in turn
depends upon the facts and the circumstances-the total atmosphere of the
case." Rabinowitz v. United States, 339 U. S. 56, 66 (1950), overruling
Trupiano v. United States, 334 U. S. 699 (1948). For an acute analysis of
contemporary search and seizure problems, see, Kamisar, Illegal Searches
or Seizures and Contemporaneous Incriminating Statements: A Dialogue
on a Neglected Area of Criminal Procedure (1961), Ill. Law Forum 78;
Kaplan, Search and Seizure: A No Man's Land in the Criminal Law, 49
Calif. L. Rev. 474 (1961).
52 Weeks v. United States, 232 U. S. 383 (1914) (dictum); Machen, Law of
Search and Seizure 66 (1950); cf. McDonald v. United States, 335 U. S. 451
(1948); Harris v. United States, 331 U. S. 145 (1947); Go-Bart Importing
Co. v. United States, 282 U. S. 344 (1931).
53 U. S. Const. amend. IV.
54 Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U. S. 25 (1949). It should be observed that in
Wolf, although the court held that the illegally obtained evidence need not
be excluded, it also held that provisions of the fourth amendment were en-
forceable against unreasonable state action through the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment. The by-products of Wolf have been thor-
oughly analyzed in Kamisar, Wolf and Lustig Ten Years Later: Illegal State
Evidence in State and Federal Courts, 43 Minn. L. Rev. 1083 (1959).
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was inadmissible in federal courts, the exclusionary rule did not
apply to the states.5 5 By 1960, time had set its face against the
rationalization of Wolf, for in that year the Court in Elkins v.
United States,5 6 held that evidence obtained by state officers,
which violated the defendant's immunity from unreasonable
searches and seizures under the fourth amendment, was inad-
missible over the defendant's timely objection in a federal crimi-
nal prosecution. In that case, the Court overruled the well en-
trenched "silver platter" doctrine which in essence had allowed
the admission in federal courts of evidence illegally obtained by
state officers where there was no participation by federal agents.
However, Elkins did not alter the power of state courts to admit
or exclude evidence regardless of its source.
In Mapp v. Ohio,5 7 decided in June 1961, the Court ruled
that since the fourth amendment's right of privacy had been de-
clared enforceable against the states through the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment, it was likewise enforceable
against them by the same sanction of exclusion as is used against
the federal government. By extending the substantive protec-
tions of due process to all constitutionally unreasonable searches
-state or federal-it thus became logically and constitutionally
necessary that the exclusion doctrine, an essential part of the
right to privacy, be made an essential ingredient of the rights af-
forded by Wolf.5 Criticism of such a radical departure from
55 Weeks v. United States, 232 U. S. 383 (1914). See Fed. R. Crim. P. 26.
56 364 U. S. 206 (1960).
57 6 L. Ed. 2d 1081 (1961). Defendant had been convicted of knowingly
having had in her possession and under her control certain obscene litera-
ture and photographs in violation of Ohio law. The Supreme Court of Ohio
in State v. Mapp, 170 Ohio 427, 166 N. E. 2d 387 (1960), ruled that her convic-
tion was valid even though it was based primarily upon the introduction
into evidence of articles unlawfully seized by police during an unlawful
search of the defendant's home. On appeal the United States Supreme
Court, by a 5-3 decision, reversed and held that all evidence obtained by
searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution is inadmissible in
state court. Mr. Justice Stewart entered a memorandum stating that he
expressed no view as to the merits of the constitutional issue which the
court had decided.
58 Essential to the majority's argument against Wolf was the proposition
that the Weeks rule of exclusion derived not from the supervisory power
of the Court over the federal judiciary, but from Constitutional require-
ment. The exclusionary rule thus became an essential part of both the
fourth and fourteenth amendments. In a sense it is regrettable that the
Court, in overruling Wolf, did so in such broad terms, apparently applying
the full body of federal search and seizure law to the states. It becomes
difficult to realize that the many minor as well as major irrationalities in
the law of search and seizure have suddenly achieved Constitutional dimen-
(Continued on next page)
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precedent may well follow, and indeed, the effects of this land-
mark decision are far from apparent at this juncture. One fact
is certain in the gathering haze, and that centers about the new
importance of the searches and seizures question as it relates to
methods employed in procuring samples for chemical testing.
The Supreme Court of the United States has not yet ruled
on the reasonableness of an internal search of the body or its sub-
stances; nor has it adopted a fourth amendment standard for
such searches.59 And although lower federal courts and state
courts have passed upon the problem on numerous occasions,
one fact stands out-their opinions are not always in accord and
their analogies are frequently strained.
(1) The Federal Decisions
Although not directly related to the chemical-testing prob-
lem, a Ninth Circuit decision in Blackford v. United States,60
inched close to a solution of the general problem of internal
(Continued from preceding page)
sion. In overruling Wolf the majority found support in the established
doctrine that the admission in evidence of an involuntary confession renders
a state conviction constitutionally invalid. As pointed out in the dissenting
opinion of Mr. Justice Harlan, the analogy does not necessarily follow.
The coerced confession rule does not exclude all statements illegally ob-
tained, otherwise a statement procured during a period of illegal detention
might well be classified as unlawfully seized evidence, illegally obtained,
and be subject to exclusion on that basis. The Court has consistently re-
fused to reverse state convictions resting upon the evidential use of such
statements. It is possible that the Court in future decisions will recognize
the virtues of federalism by applying exclusionary rules to the states only
in cases of serious breach. Mr. Justice Black, in concurring with the ma-
jority result, did not subscribe to the view that the Weeks rule of exclusion
derived from the fourth amendment. It was his premise that the end re-
sult could be achieved by bringing the fifth amendment to the aid of the
fourth, recognizing a close relationship between the fourth and fifth amend-
ments so explicitly outlined by the Court in Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S.
616 (1886). Concluding that the fourth amendment ban against unreason-
able searches and seizures should be considered together with the fifth
amendment ban against compelled self-incrimination, Mr. Justice Black
found a constitutional basis emerging which not only justified but required
the exclusionary rule. But regardless of the fourth-fifth coalition, the Court
has consistently reiterated the doctrine that the fifth amendment privilege
against self-incrimination is not applicable to the states. Cohen v. Hurley,
366 U. S. 117 (1961).
59 For a comprehensive treatment of the historical implications of the fourth
amendment, see Fraenkel, Search and Seizure Developments in Federal
Law Since 1948, 41 Iowa L. Rev. 67 (1956); Trimble, Search and Seizure
Under the Fourth Amendment as Interpreted by the United States Supreme
Court (pts. 1-4), 41 Ky. L. J. 196, 388, 42 Ky. L. J. 197, 423 (1952-1954).
60 247 F. 2d 745 (9th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 356 U. S. 914 (1958). See Note,
106 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1165 (1958).
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bodily search. Blackford was stopped by customs officers at the
international boundary line in California.0 ' He was asked to re-
move his coat, whereupon numerous puncture marks were re-
vealed in the veins of his arms. Further examination of his per-
son disclosed that the defendant may have concealed a quantity
of heroin in a body cavity. Thereafter he was taken to a hospital
where, despite his denial of concealment and his resistance to
search, qualified medical personnel removed the heroin. In a
subsequent prosecution for illegal importation and concealment
of heroin, the defendant's motion to suppress the evidence thus
obtained was denied. The court of appeals affirmed the denial,
holding that the search and seizure did not violate either the
fourth or fifth amendment. But in arriving at its decision, the
court specifically indicated that the fourteenth amendment did
provide a bulwark against unreasonable searches and seizures
of persons as well as places. The court applied the test of reason-
ableness to the conduct of the officers, noting that this was a
stricter test than that applied to state proceedings under the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment.6 2
The fourteenth amendment draws no precise distinction be-
tween searches of property and searches of the person, but ac-
cepted values concerning the dignity of the human body compel
a conclusion that some reasonable limit should be placed upon
internal bodily searches. Those espousing an extreme point of
view, dedicated to the idea that the human body is inviolate, as-
61 Search of persons, vehicles and vessels by customs inspectors is author-
ized by Rev. Stat. § 3061 (1875), 19 U. S. C. § 482 (1958); 49 Stat. 521 (1935),
19 U. S. C. § 1581 (1958); 46 Stat. 748 (1930), 19 U. S. C. § 1582 (1958).
62 Although stating that the test of reasonableness was more stringent than
that required by the fourteenth amendment, the court nonetheless relied on
Rochin v. California, 342 U. S. 165 (1952) and Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U. S.
432 (1957), fourteenth amendment cases, as furnishing the most practical
guides. The court referred to several material factual differences which
led it to conclude that Rochin was not dispositive of Blackford. Rochin was
subjected to a series of abuses and violations of his rights, commencing
with an unlawful entry into his home, continuing with the forcible attempt
by officers to prevent him from swallowing capsules, and culminating in a
brutal episode of stomach pumping. On the other hand, police officers made
no attempt to force evacuation of the heroin from Blackford's rectum, and
the actual physical examination was conducted by qualified medical per-
sonnel, under sanitary conditions, and with the use of medically approved
procedures. Furthermore, the officers in Rochin had only a suspicion that
the defendant had swallowed narcotic pills, but the officers in Blackford
had almost incontrovertible proof that their subject possessed hidden nar-
cotics. The court also took judicial notice of the fact that in the preceding
two and one-half years, twenty per cent of the smuggling cases in the San
Diego area had involved narcotics in body cavities.
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sert that almost all internal searches are unreasonable. 3 Yet,
this thesis appears undesirable in that a total prohibition of in-
ternal bodily searches would unnecessarily place valuable evi-
dence beyond the reach of law enforcement officers. The Black-
ford decision indicated that there is nothing in the Bill of Rights
which makes a body cavity a legally-protected sanctuary for
carrying narcotics. Granted, the court decided only the precise
issue before it and did not offer carte blanche authority to sub-
ject a human being to any type of physical examination, but the
court did state that it considered pain and danger to be minimal
factors in the instant situation, particularly since much of the
pain resulted from the defendant's own resistance.
Several lower federal court cases subsequent to Blackford
have followed it approvingly. In King v. United States,6 4 the
Fifth Circuit cited Blackford in upholding a similar search, noting
the sterility which would follow efforts at law enforcement if
searches of this type were to be prohibited. Similarly a federal
district court has upheld as reasonable the search of a narcotics
addict as he crossed the border from Mexico to the United
States.6 5 Following thorough search a drug container was ex-
tracted from the defendant's rectum by a physician under police
direction, and judicial sentiment decreed that this method of
search did not "shock the conscience" within the meaning of the
phrase as used by the Supreme Court in Rochin v. California.6 6
63 This seems to represent the viewpoint of Mr. Chief Justice Warren and
Justices Black and Douglas who dissented in Breithaupt v. Abram, 352
U. S. 432, 440 (1957). Cf. United States v. Townsend, 151 F. Supp. 378
(D. D. C. 1957). In the Townsend case, defendant was charged with carnal
knowledge of a girl under sixteen, and there was evidence that the com-
plaining witness was menstruating at the time of the alleged offense. In-
formed that chemical tests would be run on his penis to determine the
presence of blood, defendant offered physical resistance, but a police detec-
tive overcame this resistance by twisting the defendant's arms behind his
back. Meanwhile a sergeant pulled down the defendant's trousers and
swabbed his penis with patches of chemically treated cotton. In a well
documented opinion Judge Youngdahl concluded that the defendant had
been deprived of due process of law under the fifth amendment. Aside
from the fact that evidence obtained in this case was of doubtful probative
value, it must be noted that the defendant was taken to police headquarters
in the middle of the night and denied the right to contact an attorney.
64 258 F. 2d 754 (5th Cir. 1958).
65 Application of Woods, 154 F. Supp. 932 (N. D. Cal. 1957), appeal denied,
249 F. 2d 614 (9th Cir. 1957). Two recent federal decisions have cited Black-
ford with approval. Witt v. United States, 287 F. 2d 389 (9th Cir. 1961);
Murgia v. United States, 285 F. 2d 14 (9th Cir. 1960). Accord, United States
v. Michel, 158 F. Supp. 34 (S. D. Tex. 1957).
66 342 U. S. 165 (1952). More extensive comment regarding due process
aspects of the Rochin decision follows at text accompanying notes 76-88
infra.
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Where more radical search tactics have been employed, courts
have not been hesitant about declining to apply the seal of
reasonableness.67
Blackford and similar decisions may present a common-sense
solution of the search and seizure problem relating to the seizure
of foreign substances from body cavities, but they leave un-
answered the question whether constitutional prohibitions should
be extended to the forceful obtaining of body substances. Anal-
ogies may clarify some of the patent ambiguities but analogies
fail to be convincing unless translated into practical terms.
Dean Ladd and Professor Gibson have stated that the constitu-
tional "provision against unlawful searches and seizures was
designed to serve as a security to persons in their possessions
and effects, to protect the individual from an invasion of his home
without proper warrant . . . and to protect the individual from
being searched personally for his possessions without reason or
suspicion." os In essence this type of protection deals with things
which a person might possess and with the privacy of his home
rather than with his personal make-up or physical condition.
Thus, they would advocate that a test of body substances or a
physical examination should not come within the range of the
constitutional restraint upon unlawful search and seizure. The
argument is unassailable that history supports this contention,
for the fourth amendment originally was designed to curb the
nefarious practice of arbitrary government invasion of private
homes. It is difficult to believe that the framers of the Constitu-
tion could have envisaged the uses to which biochemistry might
be put in a twentieth century world, and there is strong reason
to doubt that they would have included a search for body sub-
stances as such within the ambit of their prohibitory sanctions.
If case law recognized and enforced this proposition, the search
and seizure problem would not beg solution, but precedents re-
lating to searches and seizures of body substances are few in
number and rarely reveal unity of sentiment, let alone accuracy
in research. For the moment we must consult state-court de-
cisions for pertinent chemical-test cases, yet only the future will
67 Two district courts have held that the use of a stomach pump and an
emetic to recover swallowed narcotics is unreasonable. United States v.
Willis, 85 F. Supp. 745 (S. D. Cal. 1949); In re Guzzardi, 84 F. Supp. 294 (N.
D. Tex. 1949).
68 Ladd & Gibson, The Medico-Legal Aspects of the Blood Test to Determine
Intoxication, 24 Iowa L. Rev. 191, 216 (1939).
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determine the extent to which state tribunals may proceed in
effectuating the right to freedom from arbitrary intrusions.
(2) The State Decisions
The Supreme Court of California, in People v. Duroncelay,69
ruled that the taking of a blood sample did not constitute an
unlawful search and seizure. There was no evidence that the
defendant had consented to the taking of the test; nor, on the
other hand, was there evidence that he verbally protested against
its being performed. There was evidence, however, that he drew
his arm away when the nurse first attempted to insert the needle
and that an ambulance driver then held his arm while the nurse
extracted the blood. Affirming the trial court's ruling admitting
the chemical-test results, the supreme court found that there
was a lawful arrest in this instance and stated that the search
was not unlawful merely because it preceded, rather than fol-
lowed, the arrest.7 0 A search may constitutionally be made
either before or after arrest if reasonable grounds for making
an arrest exist at the time of the search. It was not apparent
exactly when the arrest had been made, but since the defendant
was unconscious for a greater part of a forty-eight hour period,
it would be assumed that the arrest took place after that time.
Some courts, however, have been more lenient with intoxi-
cated offenders. Despite the fact that Iowa did not adhere to the
rule excluding evidence obtained through an unreasonable search
and seizure, the Supreme Court of Iowa has held evidence of a
blood test inadmissible when blood was obtained from the body
of an unconscious motorist, no arrest having been made or in-
69 48 Cal. 2d 766, 312 P. 2d 690 (1957).
70 Several years ago, the Supreme Court of Arizona, in State v. Berg, 76
Ariz. 96, 259 P. 2d 261 (1953), ruled that forcefully obtaining a breath
specimen for chemical-testing purposes did not violate the searches and
seizures provision of the Arizona Constitution. Following arrest for driving
while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, the defendant refused to
submit to a drunkometer test. Despite his strenuous objections, police
officers strapped him to a chair, and while one held the defendant's head
steady, another captured his breath by means of a rubber suction bulb and
tube. Holding that this police action did not constitute an unlawful search
and seizure, the appellate court observed that the defendant was not forced
to exhale breath from his lungs inasmuch as he exhaled voluntarily and, in
fact, of necessity to survive. The moment his breath passed his lips, it was
no longer his to control but became part of the surrounding atmosphere.
Thus the officers had the lawful right to capture his breath for use as evi-
dence. Under the circumstances, this was a novel holding but not con-
vincing as a precedent, particularly with reference to the factor of volition.
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formation filed. 71 The defendant, painfully injured in an auto-
mobile collision, was transported to a nearby hospital for treat-
ment. While he was on the operating table, a coroner from
another county proceeded to draw blood from his arm, without
requesting the consent of the defendant's wife, who was waiting
in the hospital corridor. Here, then, was a situation where a
volunteer, without legal warrant and without express or implied
assent, drew blood from an unconscious person to insure the
success of possible future prosecution. In rejecting expert testi-
mony relative to chemical-test results, the majority did not rely
on unreasonable search and seizure or lack of due process but
was content to rest the decision upon its abhorrence of the
coroner's insensate behavior.7 2
A recent Wisconsin case, State v. Kroening,7 3 rejected chemi-
cal-test evidence on grounds of unreasonable search and seizure.
Following an automobile accident, the defendant was admitted to
a hospital where a blood sample was taken by a registered nurse
with the consent of the attending physician, at the request and
upon the direction of the district attorney. The blood sample
was drawn while the defendant was unconscious or at the most
semiconscious-hence taken without his real consent. He was
not arrested on any charge until after the coroner's inquest nine
days later. The state contended that the taking of the blood
sample was not a search and seizure in the constitutional sense
but merely a part of a physical examination; nevertheless, the
court disagreed, holding that a search and seizure and a physical
examination are not necessarily mutually exclusive.74 The court
recognized that a search and seizure incidental to a lawful arrest
would not violate constitutional rights of the person searched,
but it found that the lapse of time in this case between search
and arrest was far too long to support a conclusion that this
71 State v. Weltha, 228 Iowa 519, 292 N. W. 148 (1940).
72 In Weltha the court refused to overrule its prior decision in State v.
Tonn, 195 Iowa 94, 191 N. W. 530 (1923), which held proper the admission
of the analysis of blood taken from the defendant without his consent but
at the time he was under arrest. Yet the court expressly stated that, if
valid, the Tonn case was to be confined to its precise facts. In State v.
Sturtevant, 96 N. H. 99, 70 A. 2d 909 (1950), the Supreme Court of New
Hampshire noted that the view entertained in Weltha did not prevail in
that state.
73 274 Wis. 266, 79 N. W. 2d 810 (1956). Note, 41 Marq. L. Rev. 93 (1957).
74 "We do not understand that the constitutional provision in question for-
bids officers to go through one's pockets but permits them to go through
his veins." 274 Wis. at 273, 79 N. W. 2d at 815.
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search was an incident to the arrest. The court further ob-
served that admitting evidence in violation of the defendant's
rights under the state constitution constituted a denial of due
process under Wisconsin law, and that violation by the state
of its own constitution would inevitably deny the defendant due
process within the meaning of the fourteenth amendments.75
It is apparent that the foregoing decisions have stressed two
basic factors in determining whether a search and seizure would
be unlawful under the circumstances: (1) time of search in re-
lation to arrest; and (2) presence or absence of unreasonable,
abusive physical force. If little or no force is employed and the
75 A later decision by the Supreme Court of Michigan in Lebel v. Swincicki,
354 Mich. 427, 93 N. W. 2d 281 (1958), deserves consideration. At the direc-
tion of a physician, blood was drawn from an unconscious motorist who
was not under arrest at the time. Chemical-test evidence was admitted in
the trial court, but the Supreme Court of Michigan held the evidence in-
admissible as a violation of the Michigan Constitution prohibiting unreason-
able search and seizure. The majority opinion stressed the fact that the
blood sample was taken in violation of the defendant's right of security to
his person and saw no distinction in principle between obtaining a blood
sample from an unconscious person and taking such from a conscious per-
son by force. Moreover, the court concluded that the majority opinion in
Breithaupt had held that evidence against Breithaupt had been obtained in
violation of the fourth amendment, and further observed that provisions of
the Michigan Constitution were identical in substance with those of the
fourth amendment. If the Michigan court's assumptions are correct, one
would not be in a position to deny the validity of its final decision, but it is
submitted that the majority opinion in Breithaupt did not hold that the
evidence in that case was obtained in violation of rights protected by the
fourth amendment; only by strained implication can one reach such a
conclusion.
In State v. Wolf, 164 A. 2d 865 (Dela. 1960), the Supreme Court of
Delaware has come to the defense of the unconscious motorist. Within two
hours after accident, a blood sample was taken from subject offender by a
qualified physician. The defendant had not been placed under arrest. Ap-
proximately two weeks later the defendant was arrested and charged
with operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating
liquor. Defendant filed a motion to suppress the results of the analysis of
his blood sample on the ground that the taking was an illegal search and
seizure in violation of the Delaware Constitution. The superior court
thereupon certified the question to the supreme court of that state. The
supreme court found for unlawful search and seizure, following Weltha,
Kroening, and Swincicki, distinguishing Duroncelay on the ground that the
blood sample in that case had been taken as an incident to lawful arrest.
Nevertheless, the court did note that the instant situation could be cured
by appropriate legislative action. By obtaining a license to drive, sug-
gested the court, the applicant, by accepting, would be deemed to have
given his consent to chemical analysis of body fluids. Implied consent
legislation is discussed infra, in text accompanying notes 92-101.
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin in Martell v. Clingman, 11 Wis. 2d
296, 105 N. W. 2d 446 (1960), has lately rejected the defense of unreason-
able search and seizure in the case of an unaware defendant. A motorist,
while in semi-conscious condition and not under arrest, voluntarily urinated
in a bottle held by the police, without realizing that the officers were intent
on obtaining evidence as to alcoholic content. Held: search and seizure
were not unreasonable under the circumstances.
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search is conducted by qualified personnel at or near the time of
arrest, it is likely that judicial disfavor and rebuff will be kept
at a minimum. On the other hand, if the search and seizure are
made without due regard to time of arrest and where elements
of force are obvious, one might expect to cope with strong ju-
dicial resentment. Between these extremes of conduct, how-
ever, lies a twilight zone where predictions might well go awry,
most notably in these times of constitutional uncertainty.
C. Due Process
A third constitutional problem is whether the chemical-test
procedure violates due process.76 A leading analogous Supreme
Court decision is Rochin v. California.7 7 California police sus-
pected Rochin of selling narcotics. They unlawfully broke into
his room and were about to seize two capsules lying on a night-
stand when Rochin thrust the capsules into his mouth. Rochin
was then taken to a nearby hospital and strapped to a table while
a physician forced a tube and emetic solution down his throat,
causing him to disgorge the contents of his stomach. Tried and
convicted on a charge of illegally possessing morphine, the cap-
sules were admitted over his objection. A district court of appeal
affirmed the conviction,78 and the Supreme Court of California
refused to grant a re-hearing.7 9 On certiorari the Supreme Court
of the United States reversed the conviction on grounds of vio-
lation of due process.80 Mr. Justice Frankfurter, writing for the
majority,8 1 reasoned that the conviction rested on evidence
76 A tangential problem to that of the constitutionality of chemical testing
to determine whether a person is under the influence of alcohol is whether
due process requires a jury trial in a prosecution in municipal court for
driving while under the influence of alcohol. The Supreme Court of Min-
nesota recently reversed a municipal court's denial of jury trial in such a
case. State v. Hoben, 256 Minn. 436, 98 N. W. 2d 813 (1959). In Hoben,
jury trial was decreed necessary because the court was of the opinion that
prosecutions of traffic violations should receive uniform treatment through-
out the state. But a prosecution for disorderly conduct under city ordi-
nance was held properly tried by court without jury for the reason that it
related to a matter of local concern. State v. Mulally, 257 Minn. 21, 99 N. W.
2d 895 (1959).
77 342 U. S. 165 (1952).
78 People v. Rochin, 101 Cal. App. 2d 140, 225 P. 2d 1 (1950).
79 People v. Rochin, 101 Cal. App. 2d 143, 225 P. 2d 913 (1951).
80 Rochin v. California, 342 U. S. 165 (1952). See Notes, 50 Mich. L. Rev.
1367 (1952); 4 Stan. L. Rev. 591 (1952).
81 Justices Black and Douglas concurred in the result but on different
grounds. They considered the admission of the evidence a violation of the
privilege against self-incrimination.
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which was inadmissible because it was obtained by methods "too
close to the rack and the screw . . ." 82 Relying upon the "co-
erced confession" cases, the majority drew no distinction between
forced extractions from the mind and forced extractions from
the body.
Following the Rochin decision, the due process argument
was unsuccessfully invoked in numerous criminal cases involv-
ing the admissibility of chemical-test evidence.83 Five years after
Rochin the precise question was directed to the attention of the
Supreme Court of the United States in the celebrated case of
Breithaupt v. Abram.8 4 Petitioner Breithaupt was seriously
injured in an automobile accident in which three other persons
were killed. He was taken to a hospital, and while he lay un-
conscious in the emergency room, the smell of liquor was de-
tected on his breath. At the request of a state patrolman, a
physician extracted a blood specimen to determine whether the
petitioner was intoxicated, and evidence concerning alcoholic
content of the specimen was subsequently admitted at the trial
where he was convicted of involuntary manslaughter. No ap-
peal was taken and a subsequent petition for a writ of habeas
corpus was denied by the Supreme Court of New Mexico.8 5 In a
6-3 decision, the Supreme Court of the United States affirmed
the denial of the writ. 0 In substance, the Court held that the
petitioner's conviction did not deny him the due process of law
guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment.
Breithaupt attempted unsuccessfully to invoke the bar of
Rochin, but the majority distinguished the case on the fact that
there was nothing brutal or offensive in the taking of a blood
sample when done under the protective eye of a physician. How-
ever, the Court did suggest that the indiscriminate taking of
blood under different conditions or by persons not qualified to
do so might be the kind of brutality proscribed by Rochin.
82 342 U. S. at 172.
83 State v. Berg, 76 Ariz. 96, 259 P. 2d 261 (1953); People v. Haeussler, 41 Cal.
2d 252, 260 P. 2d 8 (1953), cert. denied, 347 U. S. 931 (1954); People v. Kiss,
125 Cal. App. 2d 138, 269 P. 2d 924 (1954). In the last case cited, a California
district court of appeal indicated that test results would be excluded only
where the accused was so terrorized into submission that to admit evidence
as such would be a mockery and a pretense of a trial.
84 352 U. S. 432, 71 Harv. L. Rev. 161 (1957), 42 Minn. L. Rev. 662 (1958),
35 Texas L. Rev. 813 (1957), 11 Vand. L. Rev. 196 (1957).
85 Breithaupt v. Abram, 58 N. M. 385, 271 P. 2d 827 (1957).
86 Mr. Chief Justice Warren and Justices Black and Douglas dissented. Mr.
Justice Clark wrote the majority opinion.
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In dissent, Mr. Justice Douglas observed that, as he under-
stood the court's decision, there would be a violation of due
process if blood had been withdrawn from the accused after a
struggle with the police. "Under our system of government," he
said, "police cannot compel people to furnish evidence necessary
to send them to prison." 87 The weakness in his position is that
it almost assumes that responsibility is one-sided and that the
individual has only minimal obligations of citizenship. If no force
whatsoever were countenanced, the law-abiding citizen would, in
effect, be penalized unfairly; the obstreperous, vocative citizen
would succeed in his mission to thwart the law at every turn.8
D. Physician-Patient Privilege
The common law recognized no privilege for confidential
information imparted by a patient to a physician. In 1828, New
York became the first state to depart from this rule when its leg-
islature provided for a physician-patient privilege, and since that
date a majority of American jurisdictions have enacted similar
statutes.8 9 Though the statutory provisions lack complete uni-
87 352 U. S. at 443. Dissenting in Hannah v. Larche, 363 U. S. 420, 506
(1960), Mr. Justice Douglas has more recently taken the "chamelion-like"
due process decisions in Rochin and Breithaupt to task: ". . . one who tries
to rationalize the cases on cold logic or reason fails. The answer turns on
the personal predilections of the judge; and the louder the denial the more
evident it is that emotion rather than reason dictates the answer. This is a
serious price to pay for adopting a free-wheeling concept of due process,
rather than confining it to the procedures and devices enumerated in the
Constitution itself." Mr. Justice Black has been equally critical of the
Rochin-type test. Concurring in Mapp v. Ohio, 6 L. Ed. 2d 1081, 1096
(1961), he stated: "As I understand the Court's opinion in this case, we
again reject the confusing 'shock the conscience' standard of the Wolf and
Rochin cases and, instead, set aside this state conviction in reliance upon
the precise, intelligible and more predictable constitutional doctrine enun-
ciated in the Boyd case." He likewise concurred in the reversal of the
Rochin case, but on the ground that the fourteenth amendment made the
fifth amendment's provision against self-incrimination applicable to the
states, which was in essence the constitutional doctrine of Boyd v. United
States, 116 U. S. 616 (1886).
88 Forceful investigatory procedures were approved as reasonable in the
following decisions: Blackford v. United States, 247 F. 2d 745 (9th Cir.
1957); United States v. Michel, 158 F. Supp. 34 (S. D. Tex. 1957); Applica-
tion of Woods, 154 F. Supp. 932 (N. D. Cal. 1957).
89 Statutes are compiled and quoted in 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2380 n. 5 (3d
ed. 1940). The American Law Institute Code of Evidence was originally
drafted without reference to any privilege for medical secrets in court;
however, last-minute pressure exerted by attorneys from jurisdictions
which have enacted the privilege, caused the draftsmen of the Code to in-
sert three sections establishing the physician-patient privilege. Similarly,
at the 1950 meeting of the National Commissioners on Uniform State Laws,
(Continued on next page)
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fo rmity, generally they do provide that a licensed physician
shall not, without the consent of his patient, divulge any informa-
tion or any opinion with respect to knowledge acquired in at-
tending the patient in a professional capacity.
The problem to be examined here is: If a physician draws a
blood sample or any body fluid from the body of an inebriate,
should the physician-patient privilege preclude the physician
from testifying? Certainly, where there is no showing that the
running of a chemical test is at all necessary to enable the phy-
sician to treat or to diagnose the person, the privilege should not
apply.90 In most cases the record will show affirmatively that
the test was performed by the physician at the request of a pub-
lic officer, and medical services so rendered are rarely, if ever,
performed in an atmosphere of personal confidence. The privilege
seeks its roots in a confidential relationship, and the bond be-
tween doctor and inebriate can scarcely be labeled confidential.
A closer question may arise when the physician who is
called to act in a professional capacity discovers that the subject
whom he is to attend needs emergency treatment. Even assuming
that he gives such emergency treatment, this factor alone should
not spell a confidential relationship which would bar use of the
test results inasmuch as the chemical-testing situation is a matter
entirely divorced from the treatment effort.9 1
(Continued from preceding page)
it was voted that the privilege should not be recognized. Nevertheless at the
1953 meeting, the Conference reversed its previous action and by a close
vote decided to include the privilege. See Model Code of Evidence, Rules
220-23 (1942); Uniform Rules of Evidence, Rule 27 (1953). See generally
McCormick, Evidence § 101 (1954); Chafee, Privileged Communications: Is
Justice Served or Obstructed by Closing the Doctor's Mouth on the Witness
Stand? 52 Yale L. J. 607 (1943).
90 Hanlon v. Woodhouse, 113 Colo. 504, 160 P. 2d 998 (1945); Lebel v. Swin-
cicki, 354 Mich. 427, 93 N. W. 2d 281 (1958). "It is manifestly clear from the
reasons upon which the privilege is based and from the decided cases that
where no treatment is made or contemplated, there exists no relationship
between the doctor and patient that will support the privilege." Ladd &
Gibson, supra note 68, at 254.
91 Richter v. Hoglund, 132 F. 2d 748 (7th Cir. 1943); State v. Townsend, 146
Kan. 982, 73 P. 2d 1124 (1937); People v. Barnes, 197 Misc. 477, 98 N. Y. S.
2d 481 (Sup. Ct. 1950); Schwartz v. Schneuriger, 269 Wis. 535, 69 N. W. 2d
756 (1955). Contrary to the general trend, the Supreme Court of Indiana
has lately expanded the scope of the privilege while indicating that the
statute in question should be strictly construed. Alder v. State, 239 Ind. 68,
154 N. E. 2d 716 (1958). A blood sample was drawn from the defendant
while he was lying unconscious in a hospital, and the court placed con-
siderable reliance upon a previous Indiana decision which had prohibited
the testimony of an emergency-ward physician with respect to the "intoxi-
cated condition" of a patient admitted for treatment. Chicago, S. B. & L. S.
Ry. v. Walas, 192 Ind. 369, 135 N. E. 150 (1922).
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M. Implied Consent Statutes
Disturbed by the growing menace of the intoxicated driver,
many conscientious persons have advocated enactment of legis-
lation to make chemical tests compulsory. Others have urged
that each driver should submit to chemical-testing procedures by
signing a written waiver at the time he makes application for a
license. In reality, neither proposal is practical. A compulsory
chemical-test law would be doomed to failure in those jurisdic-
tions where the judiciary has chosen to decree that the privilege
against self-incrimination applies to a compulsory taking of
physical evidence. And the second proposal would not apply to
unlicensed drivers and nonresident motorists unless every state
adopted such a provision and made the waiver broad enough
to cover submission to tests in other states.
A. Nature of the Statutes
In 1953, New York arrived at a happy solution in enacting the
first statute in this country requiring drivers to submit to a
chemical test for intoxication. 92 Nationwide reaction has been
generally favorable, and the Council of State Governments has
recommended its adoption in principle by other states. 93
The nucleus of the New York law declares that any person
operating a motor vehicle in the state shall be deemed to have
given his consent to a chemical test whenever the police suspect
him of driving while intoxicated.94 The mere operation of a motor
vehicle within the state, whether by a person licensed or un-
92 N. Y. Laws 1953, ch. 854, N. Y. Vehicle & Traffic Law, § 71-a. For an illu-
minating comment concerning the New York law, see Weinstein, Statute
Compelling Submission to a Chemical Test for Intoxication, 45 J. Crim.
L., C. & P. S. 541 (1955).
93 The Council of State Governments, Suggested State Legislation, Program
for 1954, 38-39 (1953); The Council of State Governments, Suggested State
Legislation, Program for 1955, 61-62 (1954). The legislatures of seven states
have enacted laws similar in purpose and in content to the New York
implied consent law. See Idaho Code Ann., § 49-353 (Supp. 1955); Kan.
Gen. Stat. Ann., § 8-1001 (Supp. 1957); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 39-727.03 (Supp.
1959); N. D. Rev. Code § 39-20-01 (Supp. 1959); S. D. Code § 44.0302-2
(Supp. 1960); Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.10 (Supp. 1957); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit.
23, § 1188 (Supp. 1959). Provisions of the Kansas law are nearly identical
to provisions suggested by the Council of State Governments in its 1954
report. The Kansas consent law drew favorable comment from the Supreme
Court of the United States in Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U. S. 432, 436 (1957).
94 In 1954, the clause, "believe such person to have been driving" was
amended to read, "suspect such person of driving." N. Y. Laws 1954, ch.
320, effective March 30, 1954, amending N. Y. Vehicle & Traffic Law,
§ 71-a (1).
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licensed, resident or nonresident, constitutes consent to be tested.
Implying consent in advance, through the mere operation of a
motor vehicle, avoids the difficult consent problem, for even if
the motorist is rendered insensible by consumption of intoxicants
or is unconscious or dazed as a result of trauma or other mishap,
he has consented in advance to submission to a chemical-test pro-
cedure prescribed by law. Without doubt some will assert that
the test should not be administered if the subject involved is not
capable of giving intelligent consent, but this reaction can only
thwart the purpose of the statute. It seems quite obvious that the
legislatures of the various states that have enacted consent
statutes have intended that tests should be administered in all
cases where refusals were not evident. This interpretation of
the law in no way encourages violence, and judging from the
opinion of the Supreme Court of the United States in the
Breithaupt case, no overt violation of due process is contemplated.
In short, the statutory provisions with respect to automatic con-
sent serve their most useful function in those extreme situations
where, because of injury or gross intoxication, actual consent is
difficult, if not impossible, to obtain.
Paradoxically, however, the New York law also provides
that, although the driver has constructively consented to submit
to a chemical test, he may refuse to take the test despite his im-
puted promise to consent. 95 If he refuses to submit and there-
fore does not fulfill his implied agreement, he automatically for-
feits the privilege of using the highways of the state. In effect,
he loses his driver's license or nonresident operating privilege.
This curious juxtaposition of mandatory consent with freedom of
refusal provides further insurance against the unseemly struggles
that are so likely to arise when police and citizen fail to appreciate
the import of a common purpose.
B. Constitutionality of Consent Legislation
In Schutt v. MacDuff, 96 the first case challenging the con-
stitutionality of the New York statute, an action was brought to
annul the revocation of petitioner's driver's license. The license
was revoked by the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles for the al-
leged refusal of the petitioner to submit to a blood test as de-
manded by a police officer following an arrest for driving while
intoxicated. Although it was found unconstitutional on other
95 The privilege of refusal is common to all consent statutes.
96 205 Misc. 43, 127 N. Y. S. 2d 116 (Sup. Ct. 1954).
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grounds, the validity of the statute was upheld against conten-
tions that it violated the privilege against self-incrimination, the
court holding that New York decisions have limited the effect
of the state constitutional provision to protect only against testi-
monial compulsion. 97 The court also rejected petitioner's claim
that the implied consent statute encrouched upon the constitu-
tional guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure, point-
ing to the fact that the petitioner, who was under legal arrest,
could be searched for evidence of the crime for which he was
arrested.9 8 Without hesitation, the court rejected a claim that
the statute operated to deprive the petitioner of equal protection
of the laws guaranteed by the federal and state constitutions,
stating that the law affected all persons similarly situated, that
is, persons licensed to operate motor vehicles upon the highways
of the state.
On the other hand, the court did hold that the statute vio-
lated due process, since it did not provide drivers with an op-
portunity to be heard on all questions of law and fact. Conscien-
tious approval could not be given to a statute authorizing final
revocation of a driver's license by loose and informal procedure
which left every motorist in the state at the mercy of the com-
missioner and his assistants.9 9 In effect, the court ruled that the
statute, as written, provided for an arbitrary and summary in-
fringement upon the qualified rights of a free people. It also
held the statute unconstitutional in that it lacked a provision
limiting its application to cases where there has been a lawful
arrest. 10 0 Objections, as outlined, were met by legislative amend-
97 Id. at 122-23. The opinion indicated that the constitutional privilege
would not bar the use of chemical-test results, even though body fluids
were taken while defendant was in a confused or unconscious state.
98 Until the interdict of Mapp, New York adhered to the rule that illegally-
seized evidence was admissible. People v. Defore, 242 N. Y. 13, 150 N. E.
585 (1926).
99 "Approval may not be given to a statutory provision authorizing the final
revocation of a driver's license by loose and informal procedure, for if this
were permitted, every automobile driver in the state would be at the mercy
of the commissioner and his assistants without control in the legislative
body from which the delegated authority was received." State v. Moseng,
254 Minn. 263, 270, 95 N. W. 2d 6, 12 (1959).
100 Implied Consent Statutes have as a rule provided for lawful arrest. See
e.g. Idaho Code Ann., § 49-352 (Supp. 1955); Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann., § 8-1001
(Supp. 1957); Utah Code Ann., § 41-6-44.10 (Supp. 1957). If a person, having
been placed under arrest, and having thereafter been requested to submit
to a chemical test, refuses to submit to such test, the test shall not be given.
In such event, license or permit to drive shall be revoked by a proper
licensing authority.
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ment permitting temporary suspension of a license without a
hearing but requiring a hearing prior to final revocation, and
further requiring that the subject be placed under arrest prior
to being requested to submit to a chemical test.10 1
C. Comment Upon Refusal to Submit to Chemical Testing
When a motorist refuses to submit to a chemical test, may
the fact of refusal be admitted into evidence or be commented
upon at the trial by the prosecution? The decisions are not in
agreement. For example, Connecticut, Indiana, Iowa, Ohio, South
Carolina, and Virginia have permitted comment, noting that there
has been an increasing tendency among the courts of many juris-
dictions to extend the scope of self-incrimination provisions to
unwarranted lengths. 10 2 None of these cases involved interpreta-
101 N. Y. Laws 1954, ch. 320, effective March 30, 1954, amending N. Y. Ve-
hicle & Traffic Laws, § 71-a (1). Statutory provisions as amended were held
not to violate due process on any theory. Ballou v. Kelly, 12 Misc. 2d 23,
176 N. Y. S. 2d 1005 (Sup. Ct. 1958). The fact that the statute does not re-
quire a warning by police to the effect that refusal to submit may result in
revocation of one's driver's license does not violate due process. Anderson
v. MacDuff, 208 Misc. 271, 143 N. Y. S. 2d 257 (Sup. Ct. 1955). On the other
hand, the New York Court of Appeals has indicated that it is better practice
for police to notify the motorist of his rights under the statute pertaining
to refusal to submit. People v. Ward, 307 N. Y. 73, 120 N. E. 2d 211 (1954).
A due process question, one almost certain to be raised, found practical
solution in a recent decision by the Supreme Court of Kansas in Lee v.
State, 187 Kan. 566, 358 P. 2d 765 (1961). Plaintiff had been arrested on a
charge of driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. Refusing
to submit to a blood test, a test was not made, whereupon plaintiff's driver's
license was suspended for a period not exceeding 90 days. Subsequently a
hearing was had on the question of the reasonableness of his failure to
submit to testing procedures. He contended that he was diabetic and that
he should have been given his choice of a breath, blood, urine, or saliva
test as approved by Kansas law. After full hearing at which he offered no
evidence with respect to the diabetic condition, suspension of license was
sustained. Plaintiff then filed an action in district court to compel the Motor
Vehicle Department to reinstate his license, alleging that a driver's consent
to a chemical test of his breath, blood, urine, or saliva is not given in blank,
thus insisting that consent relates to his choice of the four testing methods
approved by statute. The supreme court ruled that it was common knowl-
edge that few areas in the state possessed the technical equipment or
facilities required to administer all tests. Further, there was nothing brutal
or offensive about contemplated test procedures as they were effected under
the protective eye of a physician or qualified technician. Since the law had
given the driver the right of choice of statutory suspension of his license
and had given him the right to a hearing on the question of the reasonable-
ness of his failure to submit to the test, violation of due process was not
evident.
102 People v. McGinnis, 123 Cal. App. 2d 945, 267 P. 2d 458 (1953); State v.
Munroe, 22 Conn. Sup. 321, 171 A. 2d 419 (1961); Alldredge v. State, 239
Ind. 256, 156 N. E. 2d 888 (1959); State v. Benson, 230 Iowa 1168, 300 N. W.
275 (1941); State v. Gatton, 60 Ohio App. 192, 20 N. E. 2d 265 (1938); State
v. Smith, 230 S. C. 154, 94 S. E. 2d 886 (1956); Gardner v. Commonwealth,
195 Va. 945, 81 S. E. 2d 614 (1954); Annot., 175 A. L. R. 234, 240 (1948).
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tion of a statute granting an accused the right of refusal to sub-
mit to a chemical test. On the other hand, New York has held
that evidence of the accused's refusal to submit is inadmissible.
10 3
Furthermore, statutes of several states specifically provide that
evidence of refusal to submit to, or of failure to take, the test
shall not be admissible. 10 4
In State v. Severson,10 5 the Supreme Court of North Dakota
held that a statute'0 providing that the accused shall not be re-
quired to submit to a chemical test without his consent implied
that evidence of the results of such test could not be admitted
unless the accused consented to the test. An appellate division
of the Supreme Court of New York has ruled that the New York
courts have consistently held that under the self-incrimination
laws the receipt of evidence in a criminal trial concerning a de-
fendant's complete silence or refusal to answer is reversible er-
ror.10 7 Thus, the fact that a defendant did what he had an abso-
lute right to do could not be used to create an unfavorable in-
ference against him. Similarly, a recent New Jersey decision has
unequivocally stated that evidence of a motorist's refusal to take
a drunkometer examination was inadmissible in harmony with
the general philosophy adopted in New Jersey to protect rights
of the defendant. 0 8
The Supreme Court of Idaho has been just as emphatic in
declaring that evidence of refusal to submit to a blood test was
competent and admissible. 10 9 Like any other act or statement
voluntarily made, it was competent for the jury to consider and
weigh the fact of refusal with the other evidence, and to draw
from it whatever inference as to guilt or innocence might be
103 People v. Stratton, 286 App. Div. 323, 143 N. Y. S. 2d 362 (1955).
104 E.g. Ga. Code Ann., § 68-1625 (Rev. 1957); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. ch. 22,
§ 150 (Supp. 1957); Ore. Rev. Stat., § 483.630 (1955); Va. Code Ann.,§ 18-75.1 (Supp. 1958) (prohibits comment also); Wash. Rev. Code,
§ 46.56.010 (1951). Some states have held such evidence inadmissible on the
basis of ordinances, State v. Simonsen, 252 Minn. 315, 89 N. W. 2d 910 (1958),
analogous statutes, Jordan v. State, 163 Tex. Crim. 287, 290 S. W. 2d 666
(1956), or statutes merely prohibiting comment, State v. McCarthy, 104
N. W. 2d 673 (Minn. 1960); Duckworth v. State, 309 P. 2d 1103 (Okla. Crim.
App. 1957).
105 75 N. W. 2d 316 (N. D. 1956). The North Dakota court cited no support-
ing authority.
106 N. D. Rev. Code § 39-0801 (Supp. 1957). See comment on consent re-
quirements in text at notes 45-49 supra.
107 People v. Stratton, 286 App. Div. 323, 143 N. Y. S. 2d 362 (1955).
108 State v. Ingram, 67 N. J. Super. 21, 169 A. 2d 860 (1961).
109 State v. Bock, 80 Idaho 296, 328 P. 2d 1065 (1958).
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justified under the circumstances. Comparing the North Dakota
and Idaho statutes, the court pointed out that under Idaho law,
by operating a motor vehicle within the state, the defendant is
deemed to have given his consent to a chemical test.110 The court
also took notice of an Idaho statute which prohibited comment
when a defendant in a criminal action neglected or refused to
testify, but held that statute inapplicable in the instant case, be-
cause it applied to a defendant only as a witness and guarded
against testimonial compulsion, not against the admissibility of
real evidence."'
Modern legislation has granted the arrested motorist the
luxury of refusal, yet it does not necessarily follow that com-
ment upon refusal will work undue hardship when the motorist
stands accused at trial. Should it be admitted that the privilege
of refusal stems from an honest legislative effort to eliminate
unreasonable force in terms of police action, the accused has re-
ceived his share of benefits when he is afforded the right of re-
fusal. In the interest of peace and order, the state has sur-
rendered evidence of significant value, and beneficence at the ex-
pense of effective law enforcement should not be compounded by
denying the state the privilege of comment.
110 Idaho Code Ann., § 49-353 (Supp. 1955).
111 Idaho Code Ann., § 19-3003 (1947).
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